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The Second American Revolution in the Separation
of Powers
David Fontana*
The American Constitution creates three branches of government and
ensures that there will be sufficiently great amounts of ideological diversity
among these branches of government. Despite this regime ensuring external
heterogeneity, the American system, uniquely among the world’s major constitutional democracies, rarely creates the same degree of heterogeneity at
the highest levels of the Executive Branch that it does among the highest levels of the various branches of government. This Article discusses the
distinctiveness of the homogeneous high-level American Executive Branch
and the events that led to such a situation. At the first key moment defining
the separation of powers in the new American Constitution, the time of the
creation of the Constitution, there was still support for an Executive Branch
composed of a diverse range of leaders, and the rules of the new Constitution
did not hinder this ambition. At the second key moment defining the separation of powers in the new Constitution, the creation of the Twelfth
Amendment in 1804, a series of new rules and the political and legal realities
that followed resulted in the highest levels of the Executive Branch becoming
far more homogeneous than the one that preceded the Twelfth Amendment.
I.

Introduction

When Democratic President Barack Obama ran for the presidency in
2008, he promised to appoint members of both political parties to his cabinet
if he became President.1 After his election, President Obama retained
Republican President George W. Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Robert
Gates,2 appointed as his Secretary of Transportation former Republican
member of the House of Representatives Ray LaHood,3 and tried
(unsuccessfully) to appoint as his Secretary of Commerce Republican

* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. My thanks go to
Sanford Levinson and the editors of the Texas Law Review for inviting me to present at their
symposium on constitutional design. For comments, my thanks to Richard Hyland, Johanna Kalb,
Chip Lupu, Mike Seidman, and Peter Smith.
1. See, e.g., Sarah Baxter, Barnstorming Obama Plans to Pick Republicans for Cabinet, TIMES
(London), Mar. 2, 2008, at 22 (“Obama is hoping to appoint cross-party figures to his cabinet such
as Chuck Hagel, the Republican senator for Nebraska and an opponent of the Iraq war, and Richard
Lugar, leader of the Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.”).
2. Peter Baker & Thom Shanker, Obama Planning to Retain Gates as Defense Chief, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at A1.
3. Matthew L. Wald, Panel Approves Transportation Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at
A22.
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Senator Judd Gregg of New Hampshire.4 Obama’s decision to retain
Secretary Gates and to appoint Secretary LaHood means that Republicans5
will be overseeing two of the major areas of policy activity for the Obama
Administration: Secretary Gates will oversee the withdrawal of American
forces from Iraq and the intensification of American efforts in Afghanistan,6
and Secretary LaHood will oversee the billions of dollars of infrastructure
spending that are part of President Obama’s stimulus package.7 The current
situation—in which two members of the party that lost the last election for
President hold high-ranking executive office—is rare in the United States,
even though it is common at the highest levels of most of the world’s other
major constitutional democracies.8
Why is this so? Why are the central players (who are the focus of this
Article, rather than the entire Executive Branch) in the American Executive
Branch so homogeneous, in terms of partisanship and therefore also usually
in terms of ideological positions? There are many kinds of explanations for
this homogeneity. Part of it may have to do with the way we view elections
and our desire to give the party that wins elections control of the branch that
they won. Part of it may have to do with our distinctively political rather
than bureaucratic idea of executing the laws.
But part of the explanation of the internally homogeneous American
Executive Branch is historical and has to do with a centrally important—but
generally misunderstood and ignored—constitutional transformation: the
transformation that followed the enactment of the Twelfth Amendment in
1804. After the American presidential election of 1800, in which a close
election resulted in the House of Representatives choosing Thomas Jefferson
as President and the Senate choosing Aaron Burr as his Vice President,9 the
Twelfth Amendment was added to the Constitution to change the rules used
to select the President and Vice President of the United States. Before the
Twelfth Amendment, electors cast ballots for two individuals, without
identifying which particular office they wanted those individuals to hold, and
4. Jeff Zeleny, 2nd Pick to Run Commerce Dept. Withdraws Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at
A1.
5. While both Secretary Gates and Secretary LaHood are Republicans, Secretary LaHood
probably counts as more of a Republican because he has been elected for office as a Republican.
See, e.g., Wald, supra note 3 (“Mr. LaHood [is] a Republican former congressman from
Illinois . . . .”). Secretary Gates has long worked for Republicans, but he is not a registered
Republican. See Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer (CNN television broadcast Nov. 9, 2008), available
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0811/09/le.01.html (transcribing an interview with
Senator Reid in which he explains that Secretary Gates has “never been a registered Republican”).
6. See Peter Baker, In Announcing Withdrawal Plan, Obama Marks Beginning of Iraq War’s
End, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at A6 (discussing President Obama’s plan to withdraw troops from
Iraq and shift resources to Afghanistan).
7. Wald, supra note 3.
8. See infra section II(B)(2).
9. For a discussion of the political and constitutional controversy surrounding this, see generally
Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency, 90 VA.
L. REV. 551 (2004).
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the person finishing in second place nationally (if they had a certain minimum number of electoral votes) became Vice President.10 The Twelfth
Amendment required electors casting ballots for these national offices to
separately designate their choice for President and their choice for Vice
President.11 We study the separation of powers regime created by the original Constitution in 1787 for what it did to separate power among the
branches of government. But the separation of powers regime that resulted
when the Twelfth Amendment was created—and the series of political and
legal changes that followed it—was another revolution in the American separation of powers, this one with major implications for the “internal separation
of powers.”12 In general, though, as Sanford Levinson and Ernest Young
have noted, “[t]he Twelfth Amendment is a Rodney Dangerfield of the
Constitution: it gets no respect. Indeed, it gets little discernible attention at
all.”13 Steven Calabresi perhaps summarizes the conventional wisdom about
the Twelfth Amendment the best when he writes that “[t]he Twelfth
Amendment was a relatively nontransformative amendment because it made
one small technical change.”14
Part II of this Article explores the dynamics that lead to diverse highlevel executive branches in most of the world’s major constitutional
democracies and a substantially less diverse high-level Executive Branch in
the United States. Part III discusses the Founding Era and finds that those
involved in the creation of the Constitution in 1787 did not mean to create
this form of homogeneity within the Executive Branch. Part IV then turns to
a discussion of how the creation of the Twelfth Amendment resulted in a
change in the composition of the highest levels of the Executive Branch.

10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
11. Id. amend. XII.
12. See Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2319–22 (2006) (explaining the need for internal checks
within each branch of government).
13. Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who’s Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 29 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 925, 925 (2001).
14. Steven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court, and the Founding Fathers: A Reply
to Professor Ackerman, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 475 (2006) (reviewing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE
FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL
DEMOCRACY (2005)). Bruce Ackerman discusses the changes in understandings about the
Executive Branch following the election of 1800, but more in terms of how the presidency was
understood and not how the Executive Branch in general would operate. See BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 143–44 (2005) (“The presidential office also lacked the plebiscitarian
symbolism it has since acquired . . . . This rhetorical development was only at its beginning in
1800.”).
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The External Heterogeneity and Internal Homogeneity of American
Separation of Powers

A. External Heterogeneity
As a large, sprawling, and diverse country, it would be surprising not to
find a range of partisan and ideological perspectives in the American federal
government, and the constitutional system that was created in 1787 ensures
that a variety of viewpoints do often manifest themselves in important positions of the American federal government. The manner in which we elect
our leaders—and the breadth of the powers these leaders exercise—
substantially increases the possibility of creating a range of perspectives
between the branches of government.
A major reason for this external diversity has to do with the rules
governing elections to the federal government. For one thing, those holding
the top elected positions in the federal government are elected at different
times.15 Members of the House of Representatives are elected every two
years.16 The President of the United States is elected every four years.17
Members of the Senate are elected every six years.18 Because they are
elected at different times, the members of the different branches of government will represent different national and regional moods. American voters
cared much more about the economy during the presidential election of 2008,
for instance, than they did during the congressional elections of 2002.19 The
much more pro-war electorate in 2002 was quite different than the more anti-

15. Steven Calabresi has written that the difference in timing for these elections is one of the
defining virtues of the American regime of separation of powers. See Steven Calabresi, Why
Professor Ackerman Is Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST.
COMMENT. 51, 57 (2001) (“Our Madisonian system of staggered elections every two years for the
House of Representatives, every four years for the presidency, and every six years for one third of
the Senate is a much more sophisticated way of sampling the popular will than that offered by the
German system. It gauges and recalibrates not only the geographical spread of particular
viewpoints but also the intensity with which opinions are held.”).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
17. Id. art. II, § 1.
18. Id. art. I, § 3.
19. Even before the financial crisis hit in September of 2008, polls indicated that Americans
cared the most about a candidate who was good on economic issues. See, e.g., LYMARI MORALES,
GALLUP, AMERICANS PRIORITIZE THE ECONOMY OVER TERRORISM: MAJORITY VIEWPOINT
PERSISTS ACROSS ALL INCOMES AND AMONG INDEPENDENTS (2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
108415/Americans-Prioritize-Economy-Over-Terrorism.aspx (indicating that 56% of Americans
favored a candidate whose greatest strength was fixing the economy versus 39% who favored a
candidate whose greatest strength was protecting the country from terrorism). In 2002, by contrast,
American policy towards Iraq was more important to voters than the economy. See, e.g., GEORGE
GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2002, at 337 (2003) (citing a Gallup poll from
October 2002 indicating that the public at large was slightly more concerned with the economy than
the war, but that those “most likely to vote” ranked the Iraq war as their higher priority by a margin
of 47% to 39%).
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war electorates of 2006 and 2008.20 Thus, the members elected to the House
and Senate in 2008—and President Obama—represent a different set of passions and priorities than those members of the House and Senate elected in
2002.
In addition to the timing of elections, the three different elected parts of
the American federal government represent different political constituencies.
The President of the United States is elected by the entire nation.21 The
Senate of the United States was elected historically by state legislatures22 and
is now elected by the voters of states.23 The House of Representatives is
elected by districts in particular states.24 Different political constituencies
will elect political officials of different political factions, and with different
political opinions. The voters from rural Alabama might prefer a different
type of politician to represent them in the House than do the voters from New
York City, and the voters from northern Alabama might prefer a different
president or different member of the Senate than the entire state of Alabama
put together.
This diversity in the politics of elected officials is only increased by the
separation of functions created by the Constitution. The Constitution creates
a “classification of governmental power into three categories [and]
allocat[es] . . . authority to three different institutions” to exercise those
different powers.25 The Constitution identifies and allocates legislative,
executive, and judicial powers, and assigns them largely to the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Branches, with some powers being exercised by
more than one branch of government.26 This recognition of different forms

20. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., COUNTRY IS “LOSING GROUND” ON DEFICIT, RICH-POOR GAP:
WAR SUPPORT SLIPS, FEWER EXPECT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME 1 (2007), http://peoplepress.org/reports/pdf/304.pdf (indicating that 55% of those polled in August 2006 said that the war
in Iraq was “not going well” and 46% favored bringing soldiers home); PEW RESEARCH CTR., EVEN
AS OPTIMISM ABOUT IRAQ SURGES, DECLINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT 1
(2008), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/453.pdf (indicating that 43% of those polled thought that
going to war was the right decision and 50% supported bringing the soldiers home); PEW
RESEARCH CTR., MIDTERM ELECTION PREVIEW: AMERICANS THINKING ABOUT IRAQ, BUT
FOCUSED ON THE ECONOMY 3 (2002), http://www.cfr.org/ (search “Midterm Election Preview”;
then follow “Acrobat Distiller, Job 26” hyperlink) (“Roughly six-in-ten (62%) currently favor
military action against Iraq.”).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”); id. amend. XII (“The Electors shall . . . vote by
ballot for President . . . .”).
22. Id. art. I, § 3.
23. Id. amend. XVII.
24. See id. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers.”).
25. M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1127, 1132 (2000).
26. See id. (“[T]he Constitution contains celebrated departures from pure separation, usually
dubbed checks and balances: the Senate’s advise-and-consent functions, thought to be executive in
nature; Congress’s involvement in the judicial function of impeachment; and the President’s power
to approve or veto legislation, involving him in the legislative function.”).
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of governmental authority—and allocation of most of those forms of authority to one branch of government or another—permits voters to identify
particular parties or ideologies that they feel are better suited for one branch
of government or another. While voters might feel that Democratic Senator
Edward Kennedy or former Texas Republican Representative Tom DeLay
can be trusted with the legislative power, they might not want either to be the
Commander in Chief of the country.27 This is why governors have done so
well in presidential elections: voters often choose a candidate with state executive experience to assume a federal executive position.28
In other words, while it is not guaranteed, it is often the case that a
range of ideologies are represented in the different branches of the federal
government. The range of rules that dictate who is elected to office and what
they do once elected to office substantially increases the possibility that there
will be partisan and ideological heterogeneity in the American federal
government—when viewed from the perspective among the federal branches
of government.
B. Internal Homogeneity
1. American Internal Homogeneity.—By contrast, while a comparison
of the branches of government at any given time is likely to indicate
substantial partisan (and therefore ideological) heterogeneity, a comparison
of the various essential officials in the Executive Branch reveals substantial
partisan and ideological homogeneity. Simply put, while the Democratic and
Republican parties alternate control of the Executive Branch, at any given
time all of the top officials in the Executive Branch are Democrats, and
Democrats of a very similar sort—or all of the top officials are Republicans,
and Republicans of a very similar sort.29 There have not, to the best of my
27. This ability to identify which politician would be better at particular governmental functions
is furthered by the Constitution’s decision to prohibit any Executive Branch officials from serving
in the Legislature, and vice versa—therefore prohibiting them from exercising multiple forms of
authority beyond those overlapping powers provided by the Constitution. See Steven G. Calabresi
& Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1062–65 (1994) (specifying the limitations the Incompatibility Clause
imposes on government officials). This interpretation of the Constitution has recently been
criticized by Seth Barrett Tillman. Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or
Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture on the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 1 (2008), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/DJCLPP/index.php?action=down
loadarticle&id=79.
28. See, e.g., Pete DuPont, Can Kerry Execute?, WSJ.COM, Aug. 12, 2004, http://www.opinion
journal.com/columnists/pdupont/?id=110005433 (“Among the 20th-century presidents, five of those
with executive experience—Teddy Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ike, Ronald Reagan and
Woodrow Wilson—ranked as great or near great. . . . Which leads to the conclusion that America is
usually better off with a president who has had executive experience before reaching the White
House.”).
29. My purpose here is not to highlight or critique the alleged normative virtues or vices of this
uniformity. Much of this normative territory is covered by articles that are part of the recent revival
of interest in what Neal Katyal has called the normatively beneficial regime of “internal separation
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knowledge, been any studies of the precise number of cross-party, high-level
Executive Branch officers over the course of American history, but we can
safely say it is quite rare, for the reasons discussed below.
One of the primary reasons for the internally homogeneous American
executive is the central role that a single figure, the President, plays in
defining the key personnel of the Executive Branch, a situation I have
described elsewhere.30 The Constitution guarantees the President the authority to appoint—subject to senatorial advice and consent—the “principal
officers of the United States.”31 This means that a singular official is guaranteed by the Constitution the right to appoint—and potentially the right to
remove—the major officials of the Executive Branch. Even beyond these
particularly high-level appointments, the President appoints, by some counts,
as many as 8,000 of the other top Executive Branch officials.32 This creates a
system in which one person—the President—selects essentially almost all of
the top Executive Branch officials. Unsurprisingly, then, the top officials in
a presidential administration reflect the party and the outlook of a singular
official, the President.33
There are, of course, constraints on the President’s ability to appoint a
homogeneous Executive Branch. For one thing, the President cannot personally make all 8,000 of these political appointments and so must essentially
delegate a large number of these appointments to other individuals—
presenting a classic principal–agent problem, and leading to perhaps a less
homogeneous Executive Branch than would exist if the President had to
appoint these officials himself. Still, though, over time the President has

of powers.” See Katyal, supra note 12, at 2316 (discussing the virtues of “executive v. executive”
disputes and checks and balances). William Marshall has highlighted the role of internal separation
of powers in state constitutions. William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State
Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 (2006).
Katyal’s and Marshall’s normative considerations regarding the internal separation of powers might
equally apply to the internal separation of perspectives. Many of the benefits—and detriments—of
dividing up powers between different executive actors might also apply to ensuring that these actors
have a range of partisan and ideological perspectives.
30. David Fontana, The Permanent and Presidential Transition Models of Defining Political
Party Policy Leadership, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 398–404 (2009).
31. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 487 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“The President has the sole responsibility for nominating [principal
officers] . . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall have Power . . . [to]
nominate, . . . by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, . . . Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States . . . .”).
32. See, e.g., Lois Romano, In Any Guise, Podesta a Smooth Master of the Transition Game,
WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2008, at C1 (noting that President Obama will likely oversee over 8,000
appointments).
33. See Anthony Bertelli & Sven E. Feldmann, Strategic Appointments, 17 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES.
& THEORY 19, 22 (2007) (noting that Presidents typically appoint ideological analogues to lead
executive agencies); Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to
Executive Branch Nominations 1885–1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1122 (1999) (stating that
Presidents typically appoint ideologically compatible party loyalists to pivotal positions).
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centralized this appointments process in the White House Personnel Office
and other individuals that the President deputizes to identify desirable political appointees.34 Presidents also sometimes face congressionally created
limitations on their power to appoint35 or to remove36 high-ranking executive
officials.
The President must answer to various political interests in making his
appointments, and these political interests can disagree with one another and
favor a broad range of officials for top Executive Branch positions—
particularly in a system like the United States where the political party that
the President comes from is large, federal, and diverse.37 The interest groups
that the President will pay attention to, though, will obviously skew heavily
in favor of interest groups that share his party and his ideology.38 Both
political parties are themselves becoming more ideologically coherent and
homogeneous,39 so over time that inevitably means the President has faced
demands to appoint individuals who much more rarely disagree with the
President on major issues.
That explains the demand side. On the supply side, those qualified to
fill high-level executive positions are homogeneous as well, particularly recently because of the attitudinal polarization of the American elite in
general40 and a series of factors (such as the creation of political primaries
and more polarized electoral districts) that have polarized those elected to
state and federal office in particular.41
This is why the story of the Vice President becomes so important. The
Vice President is one of only two (at least potentially) Executive Branch

34. See THOMAS J. WEKO, THE POLITICIZING PRESIDENCY: THE WHITE HOUSE PERSONNEL
OFFICE 1948–1994, at 11 (1995) (detailing the centralization of appointments with the advent of the
White House Personnel Office and emphasizing the importance of political appointments).
35. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2000) (“The President shall appoint in the Department of Justice,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Solicitor General, learned in the law, to assist
the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.”).
36. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 242 (1992) (stating that members of the Federal Reserve Board can
only be removed for “cause”).
37. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 277 (2000) (stating that American parties are highly decentralized
collections of state and local organizations unified under a common interest in the national
elections, with broad positions flexible enough for enormous disagreement).
38. See, e.g., Jacob Weisberg, Interest-Group Conservatism, SLATE, May 4, 2005, http://www.
slate.com/id/2118053/ (noting the influence of liberal interest groups during Democratic
presidencies and conservative interest groups during Republican presidencies).
39. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2312, 2311–12
(2001) (claiming that the political middle has “fallen out” of Congress due to party polarization).
40. See MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR?
THE MYTH OF A DIVIDED AMERICA 77 (2004) (arguing that the American political elite has
polarized but that this does not reflect similar polarization among the electorate).
41. See Mark Tushnet, Forward: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of
Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 42–46 (1999) (discussing the effects of primaries
and ideologically homogeneous districts in influencing the partisan divide).
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officials42 clearly mentioned in the Constitution. With time, the Vice
President has come to exercise substantial powers,43 and the Vice President
has become first in line to run in later elections for President.44 In other
words, perhaps as a formal matter, but certainly as a practical matter, the
Vice President is an important part of the Executive Branch. If the Vice
President was of a different party than the President, that would substantially
further the diversity of the Executive Branch. Indeed, not only would there
be a powerful member of the Executive Branch with a different perspective,
but since the Vice President often has a role in empowering other powerful
members of the Executive Branch,45 that diversity could extend beyond simply the person of the Vice President. Even if the President were from a
different political party than the Vice President, the inherent prominence of
the Vice President—particularly in recent history—means that a Vice
President from a different party than the President would have certain
substantial executive powers.
2. The Exceptionalism of American Internal Homogeneity.—The degree
of homogeneity among top-level executive officials is high by almost any
comparative measure. The American state executive features many other
directly elected officials besides simply the governor. Forty-three of the fifty
states feature independently elected state attorneys general, which sometimes
results in an attorney general of one party and a governor of another party.46
A similar structure exists in the constitutions of other countries, known as
“semi-presidentialism.” In semi-presidential systems, rather than there being
more than one directly elected executive official, there is a single directly
elected executive official and then another executive official appointed by
the directly elected legislature.47

42. There is, of course, some question about whether the Vice President is an executive official
in the first place. Former Vice President Richard Cheney argued that the Vice President was part of
the Legislative Branch. Scott Shane, Agency Is Target in Cheney Fight on Secrecy Data, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2007, at A1. Thomas Jefferson made a similar point hundreds of years ago. See
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry (May 13, 1797), in 8 THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 283, 284 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) (“I consider my office as constitutionally
confined to legislative functions . . . .”).
43. See generally JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE-PRESIDENCY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 134–202 (1982) (discussing the ways in which the
American Vice President has become more powerful over time).
44. Id. at 249–71.
45. See Dana Milbank, In Cheney’s Shadow, Counsel Pushes the Conservative Cause, WASH.
POST, Oct. 11, 2004, at A21 (describing the prominent role of David Addington, Cheney’s top
lawyer and aid, in pushing for increased executive power).
46. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 268 tbl.4.19 (37th ed. 2005)
(listing the state attorneys general and the method by which each was selected).
47. See Cindy Skach, The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism, 5 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 93, 96 (2007) (describing semi-presidential systems as those in which “a popularly
elected president with a fixed term of office” coexists with “a prime minister who is subject to a
vote of no confidence in parliament”).
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American states and countries with semi-presidential systems create the
potential48 for a heterogeneous high-level executive by providing for directly
or indirectly elected additional members of the executive branch. In parliamentary systems, in which the executive is the legislature—and therefore is
the winner of the election—the executive is often internally diverse because
the executive is composed of a coalition of several different political parties.
In many countries, several parties join together before an election,49 and most
of the time in most of the major European democracies, the executive branch
is composed of members of more than one party.50 Consider, similarly, the
situation before the recent elections in Israel, in which one of the far-right
leaders, Avigdor Lieberman, was a Deputy Prime Minister,51 and one of the
more far-left leaders, Ehud Barak, was the Defense Minister.52
In presidential systems, it is often the case that the vice president is
nominated by the president and so can be closely affiliated with the
president,53 and this has become the informal norm recently in the
presidential system of the United States.54 Even then, though, in other countries it can be the case that the vice president comes from another political
party and so is more likely to disagree with the president. In Argentina, for
instance, Vice President Carlos Alvarez resigned in 2000 because of disagreements with President Fernando de la Rua over fighting corruption,55 and
just last year Vice President Julio Cobos voted against President Cristina

48. A state attorney general and governor could be of the same political party and political
persuasion; likewise, the president and prime minister in a semi-presidential system could have the
same political profile. But the American internal executive homogeneity is essentially permanent
and constant; the potential for executive heterogeneity created by state constitutions and semipresidential constitutions means those constitutions create temporary executive heterogeneity rather
than permanent executive heterogeneity.
49. See James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, and Debt
in OECD Countries, 50 EUR. ECON. REV. 1403, 1425 n.34, available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/
eecrev/v50y2006i6p1403-1439.html (“In those countries with the most frequent coalition
governments, 46 per cent of elections from 1980–2000 feature pre-electoral pacts among parties
receiving significant votes.”).
50. Wolfgang C. Müller & Kaare Strøm, Introduction to COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN
WESTERN EUROPE 1, 2–3 (Wolfgang C. Müller & Kaare Strøm eds., 2003).
51. Rory McCarthy, Hardliner Avigdor Lieberman Set to Become Israel’s Foreign Minister,
GUARDIAN, Mar. 17, 2009, at 23.
52. New Israel Defence Minister Named, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/middle_east/6757305.stm.
53. See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 77, para. 1 (Braz.), translated in 3
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Rainer Grote eds., 2009)
(“[E]lection of the President of the Republic includes election of the Vice President registered with
him.”); id. art. 79, para. 1 (“[T]he Vice President of the Republic . . . assist[s] the President
whenever called by the President for special missions.”).
54. Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 874 (2005).
55. Clifford Krauss, Argentine President Is Trying to Keep Coalition Together, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2000, at A4.

2009]

The Second American Revolution

1419

Fernández de Kirchner’s politically controversial attempt to raise taxes on
farm exports.56
In addition, in American state constitutions and constitutions of other
countries of all forms—parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential—
executive branches are made heterogeneous by the presence of more civilservice, nonpolitical figures exercising high-level executive powers.
Sometimes these civil-service figures are “heads of state,” who are separate
from “heads of government” and exercise substantial powers.57 Sometimes
they are civil-service executive officials of a more bureaucratic temperament
who, because their promotion stands apart from the vagaries of electoral
politics, might be more likely to represent a range of perspectives—and as
mentioned before, the American Executive Branch is distinctive in the low
number of such officials that it possesses.58
III. The First Founding Moment for the Separation of Powers
What explains this difference in the structure of the American Executive
Branch? The last two Parts of this Article will focus on historical and institutional explanations—although there are surely explanations that are
cultural or political. This Part will discuss how, at the time of the creation of
the Constitution, there was at worst ambivalence, and at best approval, for
the idea of a diverse high-level executive. The main change in executive
structure that was a source of discussion at the time of the creation of the
Constitution was not how diverse high-level executive officials would be, but
rather whether the Executive would be a collegial, horizontal Executive—
composed of multiple members of roughly equal power—or a hierarchical
Executive, also composed of multiple members, but multiple members not of
equal power. This orientation persisted, even immediately before and during
the debate leading to the enactment of the Twelfth Amendment. But, as a
result of the Twelfth Amendment, and its interactions with the legal and political fabric at the time and thereafter, the American federal Executive
became both hierarchical and homogeneous.
A. From the Horizontal to the Hierarchical Executive
Scholars writing about the creation of the American presidency at the
Constitutional Convention have generally agreed that earlier failures of
56. Alexei Barrionuevo, Vote Creates Unlikely Foe for Leader of Argentina, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2008, at A6.
57. Indeed, as one article discusses, the range of prominent powers held by presidents can
include “the president’s exclusive discretion to dissolve parliament (Italy), the requirement of
countersignatures of cabinet decrees (Italy), suspensory veto over legislation (Czech Republic,
Slovakia), the power to decree new laws (Greece for some time after 1975), and appointments to
high offices, sometimes (as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia) including ministries.” Scott
Mainwaring & Matthew S. Shugart, Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical
Appraisal, 29 COMP. POL. 449, 451 (1997).
58. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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executive power in state constitutions and under the Articles of
Confederation meant that the founders wanted to create an executive stronger
than the one that existed under the Articles of Confederation regime.59 But
while this preference for a stronger executive might have meant a preference
for an executive with broad appointment and removal powers (a subject of
much scholarly debate),60 it is a different question altogether whether, as part
of that preference for a stronger executive, the founders also preferred a homogeneous executive. In fact, the founding generation seemed to welcome a
diverse executive, but one of a different structure than the diverse executives
that preceded the creation of the new federal Constitution.
An executive branch composed of more than one person could be
structured in one of two ways. First, the executive branch could feature a
“horizontal executive,” in which the multiple members of the executive
branch are roughly equal or at least concurrent in exercising powers granted
to them. Second, the executive branch could feature a “hierarchical
executive,” in which there are other members of the executive branch, but
there is a singular figure that rules over the other members of the executive
branch. The switch in the form of the executive in 1787 was from horizontal
to hierarchical, but even a hierarchical executive was meant to create the potential for heterogeneity among high-level executive officers.
The state constitutions that predated and in many ways informed the
1787 federal Constitution largely featured horizontal executives.61 In many
state constitutions, there was a separate and independent governor, but the
governor had to obtain the approval of an executive council of some sort to

59. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 30–39 (2008) (noting the historical accounts
of the long-standing preference for strong executive power by Gordon Wood and Charles Thach).
This Article is not meant to agree or disagree with arguments made by those like Calabresi and Yoo
in favor of a unitary executive. I am not making an argument about the historical understanding of
the President over other Executive Branch officials; I am merely discussing historical
understandings about the range and diversity of those in the Executive Branch, not their relative
power compared to one another. Also not making an argument about the relative power of the
Executive Branch, Akhil Reed Amar and Vik Amar state:
We use the term “unitary” executive to refer only to a White House in which the
President and Vice President are of the same party. The term has a different meaning
in cases and literature addressing the extent to which separation of powers principles
give the President countermand or removal power over individuals and agencies who
are located in the executive branch or who are exercising executive power . . . .
Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913, 923 n.43 (1992).
60. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1271–72 (2006) (arguing that textual evidence
suggests that the framers did not intend for the President to have such broad powers).
61. See, e.g., Michael Sevi, Original Intent, Timetables, and Iraq: The Founders’ Views on War
Powers, 13 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 73, 80 (2008) (finding that seven of eight states that adopted new
constitutions between 1776 and 1787 included provisions for reducing executive power, including,
inter alia, “destroying the unity of the executive office and instituting an executive council, which
made the governor more a chairman of the board than a singular leader”).
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take action on important matters.62 All of the state constitutions in effect in
1787, with the exception of New Hampshire and New York, featured a state
executive council whose task it was to “advise the Governor in the execution
of his office.”63 These councils were not as powerful as the governors’
councils of the colonial period;64 but in all the state constitutions that
provided for councils, gubernatorial activities required their approval for
major actions.65 With other horizontal executives in state constitutions, there
was no singular governor; instead, the office of the governor was itself a
multimember body, rather than the multimember body external to and advising the office of governor. The influential 1776 constitution from
Pennsylvania, for instance, had a twelve-member executive, and all twelve
members were elected separately.66 Likewise, the Federal Articles of
Confederation did not feature an executive branch.67 Instead, it featured a
rather extreme example of a horizontal executive, with several thousand
(formally equal) legislative committees administering the executive power of
the federal government.68
The failure of these horizontal executives was keenly on the minds of
the founders when they met in Philadelphia to draft the language for the new
federal Executive.69 But their response was not to abolish a heterogeneous

62. See, e.g., WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 265
(Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., expanded ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2001)
(1973) (discussing provisions of South Carolina’s constitution of 1776 requiring council approval of
certain executive decisions); MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE
CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 120 (1997) (discussing provisions of an
early version of the constitution of Maryland requiring the governor to obtain the approval of an
executive council).
63. See 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 2791 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909)
(quoting language from the North Carolina constitution as representative of state constitutional
treatment of these councils).
64. ADAMS, supra note 62, at 272–73.
65. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 59, at 31 (“The majority of these state constitutions
required governors to obtain the consent of a council of state chosen by the legislature before taking
any major executive action.”).
66. PA. CONST. § 19 (1776) (repealed 1790); see also J. PAUL SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION OF 1776, at 194–95 (1971) (discussing the plural executive created by
Pennsylvania’s 1776 constitution and its provisions for separate and staggered elections for
councilors).
67. See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. X (describing the executive powers of the “committee
of the States”); see also PAUL CHRISTOPHER MANUEL & ANNE MARIE CAMMISA, CHECKS &
BALANCES? 60 (1999) (remarking that the Articles of Confederation did not have a separate
executive branch).
68. See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 5 (stating that Congress has the power to appoint a
“Committee of the States” and “such other committees . . . as may be necessary for managing the
general affairs of the United States”).
69. See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 59, at 30 (noting the framers’ “disdain for the
weak executive branches created for the federal government by the Articles of Confederation and
for the states by the post-1776 state constitutions”).
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Executive Branch; it was simply to create a hierarchical Executive Branch
with a clearer line of authority between the chief executive and the other
Executive Branch officials. The founding Constitution meant to create more
than one member of the Executive Branch. Some Executive Branch cabinet
members of some sort were clearly anticipated.70 The Vice President of the
United States, in addition to breaking ties in the Senate71 and counting electoral votes for President,72 would also exercise executive power if he
succeeded to the presidency, as anticipated if there were problems with the
President of the United States under the 1787 Constitution.73
In fact, there were many constitutional rules in place at the time that
even seemed to encourage a result in which one of the multiple members of
the Executive Branch would have a different political orientation than the
chief executive. It was around this time that states began to create independent attorneys general,74 with Rhode Island providing for the popular election
of their attorney general.75 States revising their constitutions after 1787—or
new states drafting their first constitutions—included provisions for separately elected executive officials,76 with these officials being subordinate to a
Governor.
The rules regarding the Vice President in the original Constitution were
also consequential, because they seemed to invite a heterogeneous Executive
Branch. Even though the Constitution did not formally identify the Vice
President as an Executive Branch official, early vice presidents participated
in the activities of the Executive Branch. For example, early vice presidents
participated in cabinet meetings,77 and the first Vice President was a
prominent politician, John Adams. It is true that sometimes vice presidents
70. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President . . . may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of
their respective Offices.”).
71. See id. art. I, § 3 (“The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate,
but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”).
72. See id. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“The Electors shall meet in their
respective States . . . . And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of
Votes for each . . . . The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.”).
73. See id. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (“In Case of the Removal of the
President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties
of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President . . . .”).
74. See Marshall, supra note 29, at 2451, 2450–51 (noting that the office of attorney general
existed in all thirteen states at the time of the founding and that “[a]s the nation matured, many
states created independent attorneys general and afforded the Office even greater autonomy by
making it a popularly elected position”).
75. See Office of the Attorney General, http://www.state.ri.us/govtracker/index.php?page=
DetailDeptAgency&eid=3877 (reporting that the office has been an elected position since its
creation in 1650).
76. See Marshall, supra note 29, at 2451 (citing Ohio’s first constitution as an example of a
state dispersing the executive power over several independent officers).
77. Charles O. Paullin, The Vice President and the Cabinet, 29 AM. HIST. REV. 496, 496–500
(1924) (discussing the history of the vice-presidential role in cabinet meetings).
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would be less powerful,78 but sometimes vice presidents would be quite
powerful.
The rules regarding the selection of the Vice President made it highly
possible that the Vice President, exercising at least some degree of executive
influence some of the time, would be from a different political faction than
the President. The Vice President was not required to win any election, but
only to finish second in the balloting for President.79 Indeed, this might have
been the first “proportional representation” rule in the United States, since it
substantially increased the chances of a losing political party obtaining a position in the government by granting the vice presidency to the person who
received the second most votes for the presidency, rather than the most votes
for that office—which is why the minority political party at the time of the
debate over the Twelfth Amendment opposed changing this rule.80
Given an Executive Branch of more than one person and an Executive
Branch that was structured to permit if not even encourage internal diversity,
how can the repudiation in Philadelphia of the state collegial executive of the
pre-1787 period be explained? There was certainly still some support for a
horizontal executive in Philadelphia.81 The Virginia Plan included an executive council, similar to the model used in state constitutions, which had the
executive power to veto laws,82 and the New Jersey Plan contemplated a
horizontal executive as well.83 Eventually, though, a motion to have a single
executive passed the Committee on Detail.84

78. An example from around the time of the Twelfth Amendment serves to prove this point.
Aaron Burr, serving as Vice President during President Thomas Jefferson’s time in office, was
widely ignored, and in retaliation Burr once cast a tie-breaking vote as President of the Senate
against Jefferson’s wishes. See JULES WITCOVER, CRAPSHOOT: ROLLING THE DICE ON THE VICE
PRESIDENCY 22 (1992).
79. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (“The Electors
shall . . . vote by Ballot for two persons . . . . The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall
be the President . . . . [A]fter the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of
Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President.”).
80. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 178 (1803) (statement of Sen. Tracy) (“[T]he ruling party of the day,
ha[s] brought forward this amendment, for the purpose of preventing the choice of a Federal Vice
President at the next election.”); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 204 (“By requiring the
electors to vote separately for the two offices, they would prevent the Federalists from slipping their
man into second place.”).
81. Statements in support of a plural executive were made by several members of the
Committee on Detail debating the matter. FOUNDING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 31–32, 33 & n.3
(Richard J. Ellis ed., 1999).
82. See JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 25 (Gaillard
Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., Oxford University Press 1920) (1893) (“[T]he Executive and a
convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority
to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular
Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall
amount to a rejection.”).
83. See FOUNDING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 81, at 33 (“The New Jersey Plan
left unspecified the number of persons who would make up the federal executive, but it clearly
anticipated that it would be more than one person.”).
84. See id. at 37 (stating that a one-person executive resulted from the vote).
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But the change in thinking at the time of the federal founding was not
from an embrace to a rejection of a diverse Executive Branch. Instead, it was
from an embrace of the horizontal executive to a rejection of it and an embrace of a hierarchical executive. The chief concern in Philadelphia about
the Executive Branch was not its internal diversity, but its impotence because
of its horizontal structure.85 As a result, the Constitution creates a clear
leader of the Executive Branch: “A President of the United States of
America.”86
Indeed, there are many reasons to believe that a diverse Executive
Branch was still embraced even after the creation of the singular office of the
President of the United States. The first President after the Constitution
came into effect, George Washington, asked the ideologically opposed
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson both to be in his cabinet.87 This
heterogeneous Executive continued into the Adams Administration.
Republican Thomas Jefferson was elected Vice President, to serve under the
Federalist President John Adams.88 Adams tried to convince Jefferson to
travel to Paris to negotiate with France, the key foreign policy issue of the
time; and when Jefferson declined, Adams considered another Republican,
James Madison.89
Part of this seemingly heterogeneous Executive at the time had much to
do with the idea that politics was not meant to include parties, factions, and
ideology, but was simply a process of notables called to serve.90 But by
1796, if not before, the notion that there were no partisan or ideological
factions was not a realistic view of the world.91 And by the end of the
Adams Administration, party voting levels were “extremely high . . . , well

85. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 59, at 30 (discussing how the framers’ disdain for the
weak executive branch in the Articles of Confederation led them to the theory of the unitary
executive).
86. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added).
87. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 19 (“Washington . . . included both Hamilton and
Jefferson in his first cabinet, and desperately sought to keep these great rivals in harness. But it was
not to be. By the end of his first administration, Jefferson and Hamilton were already locked in
bitter conflict.”).
88. See JOHN FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE 332 (1992) (reviewing the results of the election,
in which Adams received seventy-one votes to Jefferson’s sixty-eight).
89. See id. at 341 (recounting Adams’s attempts to include the two Republicans in the envoy to
Paris).
90. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“[A]mong the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed union, none deserves to be
more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.”); John F.
Hoadley, The Emergence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789–1803, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 757,
778 (1980) (“[W]hen the new government was created by the Constitution, most political leaders
shared a strong anti-party tradition. Parties were perceived as agencies which would hinder the
progress of good government . . . .”).
91. See, e.g., DAVID BRION DAVIS & STEVEN MINTZ, THE BOISTEROUS SEA OF LIBERTY 259–
60 (1998) (noting that despite a belief that parties were evil, divisions among national leaders
emerged as early as 1791 and the first political party evolved in 1794).
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above levels . . . in modern times.”92 Yet still, during the 1790s there were
cabinets composed of a range of officials, and from 1797 to 1801 a President
and Vice President from diametrically opposed political parties.
The creation of the Federal Constitution in 1787, then, was not meant as
an impediment to the reality of a heterogeneous corps of elite executive
officials. The repudiation of the weaker, more horizontal Executive Branch
of pre-1787 was meant to be replaced by a stronger, more hierarchical
Executive Branch, but one that featured a degree of diversity. The heterogeneous nature of the American Executive during its earlier years—both
before and after the advent of parties and partisanship—was the practical
result of this. It was up to the second founding to change that.
IV. The Second Founding Moment for the Separation of Powers
The constitutional settlement of 1787 had substantial implications for
the division of power between the three branches of the federal government.
But many issues were not resolved by the text of 1787, the Bill of Rights that
followed it, or the decade of constitutional practice after that. It took the
“revolution of 1800”93 and the constitutional changes that followed to further
shape the new American separation-of-powers regime. For it was the
Twelfth Amendment, and the legal and political context in the years to come,
that eradicated the diverse high-level Executive Branch.
A. An Alteration in Constitutional Form
The primary concern of those drafting the Twelfth Amendment was not
the elimination of a heterogeneous Executive Branch; it was the issue of
“designation,” making sure that a political official holds the office that the
electors selected them for, not another office.94 No less a figure than
Gouverneur Morris wrote that the major problem with the mode of federal
elections before the Twelfth Amendment was the possibility that “at some
time or other a person admirably fitted for the office of President might have
an equal vote with one totally unqualified, and that, by the predominance of
faction in the House of Representatives, the latter might be preferred.”95 No
version of the Amendment included language prohibiting another Adams–
Jefferson Administration, or something else like it; and earlier versions of the

92. JOHN F. HOADLEY, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 1789–1803, at 144 (1986).
93. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 15 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 212, 212 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904) (“The
revolution of 1800 . . . was as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776
was in its form; not effected indeed by the sword, as that, but by the rational and peaceable
instrument of reform, the suffrage of the people.”).
94. See Lolabel House, A Study of the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States 42 (1901) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (recapping the
legislative genesis of the Amendment’s requirement that votes be designated for a specific office).
95. DAVID K. WATSON, 2 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY,
APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 1557 (1910).
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Amendment simply made sure to resolve this designation issue.96 Many of
those responsible for the Twelfth Amendment, then, “saw the loss of [the
chances of a diverse executive] as a cost to be borne in order to remedy the
inversion problem, rather than a benefit to be obtained as a result of the new
amendment.”97
Indeed, the spirit of the heterogeneous executive persisted in American
constitutional life. As William Marshall has noted, “as the nineteenth century unfurled, most new states provided in their constitutions for the popular
election of an attorney general (and other executive branch officials) while
many of the established states amended their constitutions to the same end.”98
The text of the Constitution itself is clear that the Vice President is to be
elected separately from the President,99 which certainly leaves open the
possibility of a Vice President from one party and a President from another
party. If the electoral votes do not settle the election, then certainly the
House of Representatives is free to vote for a President from one party100 at
the same time that the Senate votes for a Vice President of a different
party.101 Many voted against the Twelfth Amendment because they felt it
would be much more unlikely to have a President of one party and a Vice
President of another party after the Twelfth Amendment became part of the
Constitution,102 and this is why the Twelfth Amendment had to be introduced
several times in Congress before it received the requisite two-thirds
majority.103

96. See House, supra note 94, at 42 (quoting an earlier version of the Amendment which stated
“[t]hat in all future elections of President and Vice-President, the persons shall be particularly
designated, by declaring which is voted for as President and which as Vice-President”).
97. Vikram David Amar, The Cheney Decision—A Missed Chance to Straighten Out Some
Muddled Issues, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 185, 204. As Mike Seidman pointed out to me in
commenting on a draft of this Article, even as they resolved the issue of designation, the drafters of
the Twelfth Amendment could have made it more likely to have a President from one party and a
Vice President from another party, because they could have created one set of electors to choose the
President and one set of electors to choose the Vice President.
98. Marshall, supra note 29, at 2452.
99. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by
ballot for President and Vice-president . . . and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for
as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice president . . . .”) (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. See House, supra note 94, at 51 (discussing how this scenario is possible if an election is
decided by Congress).
102. For instance, John Quincy Adams objected to the Twelfth Amendment because he felt it
was “intend[ed] to prevent a federal Vice President from being chosen.” NEAL R. PEIRCE &
LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICA AND
THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 43 (1981) (quoting 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 128 (1803)).
103. A similar proposal had been discussed in 1797 in both houses of Congress, 1798 in the
Senate, 1799 in the House of Representatives, and was passed by the House of Representatives on
May 1, 1802 but did not receive the requisite two-thirds majority. Id. at 42. Part—but not all—of
the disagreement was from the Federalists, because all Federalists (except Alexander Hamilton)
opposed the Twelfth Amendment. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829, at 40 (2001).
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B. A Revolution in Constitutional Reality
Whatever the intentions of the Twelfth Amendment, the reality was
stark: It became very difficult for there to be a Vice President from one party
and a President from another party (Democratic Vice President Andrew
Johnson serving with Republican President Abraham Lincoln functioning as
a notable exception.)104 The Twelfth Amendment on its own terms did not
do this. This new reality, one present only after the Twelfth Amendment,
was because of how the Twelfth Amendment interacted with a series of political and legal changes that were to follow.105
Akhil Reed Amar and Vik Amar have argued that there were two
reasons for this reality: no desire on the part of voters to split their ballot for
President and Vice President, and no opportunity for them to do so because
of state laws that prevented voters from voting for a President of one party
and a Vice President of another party.106 One could add to the legal reasons
why a split executive was not impossible the increasing reality of state laws
(or strong norms) that prevented electors themselves from splitting their
ballots, not just voters.107 But in some ways this is overstating the case.
However true it is that “[t]icket-splitting was almost unheard of in the nineteenth century,”108 in close elections it would not have taken many electoral
votes choosing one party’s candidate for President and the other party’s candidate for Vice President to make the vice-presidential candidate on the
second-place presidential ticket have the most votes for Vice President.
The reasons, then, are much deeper than Amar and Amar acknowledge.
There is no doubt that the Twelfth Amendment, on its own terms, would
make it harder to have a heterogeneous high-level Executive Branch. Before
the Twelfth Amendment became a part of the Constitution, finishing second
was sufficient to become Vice President. After the Twelfth Amendment,
only a first-place finisher (for vice presidency) could become Vice President.
For a Vice President to be from a party different than the President—and to

104. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second
Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 667, 738 (2003) (recounting Lincoln’s decision to add
Johnson to the ticket to appeal to Northern Democrats and border-state Unionists).
105. In this way, then, the Article tells a story about constitutional change different from that
told by David Strauss, who argues that constitutional amendments have proved to be largely
irrelevant. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1457, 1459 (2001) (“[C]onstitutional amendments have not been an important means of
changing the constitutional order.”). In the case of the internal structure of the Executive Branch,
the Twelfth Amendment—or perhaps more importantly, the Twelfth Amendment’s rules plus how
those rules interacted with subsequent political and legal realities—did have significant
consequences.
106. Amar & Amar, supra note 59, at 925.
107. See Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12
J.L. & POL. 665, 690 (1996) (“In the first 150 years of the nation’s history, assertions were made in
judicial proceedings that electors must cast their ballots in accordance with the popular vote of their
states. These assertions relied on common law theories of contract or public officer duties.”).
108. JAMES Q. WILSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES 190 (1980).
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finish first in a race for Vice President in the same election as a member of
the opposing party finished first in an election for President—there had to be
a candidate popular enough, on his own, to attract many votes.
In reality, though, vice-presidential nominees became inconsequential
figures that no one paid attention to in the first place.109 After luminaries like
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson as Vice President, according to one
writer, John Calhoun was “the only American statesman of the first or second
rank who held the Vice-Presidency in the century between its occupancy by
Jefferson and by Roosevelt.”110 There was no compelling figure drawing
attention and worthy of attracting voters—or electors—to rally behind a Vice
President from a different political party than the political party of the
President. And so even in those states that permitted voters or electors to
split their ballots for President and Vice President, there was little desire to
do so—and there was little desire to persuade the states that legally prevented
split ballots to change their rules to accommodate a pervasive desire to vote
for a President from one party and a Vice President of another party.
Also, the Twelfth Amendment made it easier for powerful institutions
like political parties to control who would run for Vice President—and also
to ensure that candidates for Vice President shared the ideological views of
the party and of the candidate for President. As mentioned before, the issue
of “designation”—of identifying who was running for what office—was at
the core of the rationale for creating the Twelfth Amendment.111 And given
the increasing power of formal political parties, there was no better institution to make it clear who was running for what office than the newly
powerful political parties that emerged around the time of the Twelfth
Amendment.
With political parties controlling who would become the nominee for
Vice President, it was increasingly difficult to have a vice-presidential nominee with a compelling—and separate—identity from the political party that
nominated the Vice President and nominated the presidential candidate.112
Since a Vice President needed to finish first after the creation of the Twelfth
Amendment (in the election for Vice President), rather than second (as was
the case before the Twelfth Amendment), the support of an institution like a

109. See Albert, supra note 54, at 831–32 (cataloguing the slights upon the vice presidency
from all manner of American statesmen).
110. LOUIS CLINTON HATCH, A HISTORY OF THE VICE-PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED STATES
71 (1934).
111. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
112. See Amar & Amar, supra note 59, at 943, 943–44 (arguing that the system of tying
presidential and vice-presidential candidates “seems more an inherited product of the nineteenth
century’s political climate and the twentieth century’s inattention than a deliberate, self-conscious
choice”).
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political party became more important, and insurgent campaigns for Vice
President therefore became even more difficult.113
After the creation of the Twelfth Amendment, parties controlled the
nomination of the Vice President, and “[p]residential nominees often were
either unable or unwilling to dictate who would fill the second spot.”114 In
the latter part of the twentieth century, presidential nominees gained greater
ability to nominate a candidate of their own choosing, apart from the candidate the party preferred. Still, a similar dynamic continued—rather than the
party controlling the choice of the Vice President, the President did, so there
was still an incentive towards conformity, but now with the President and not
with the party of the President. And just like parties before, now presidential
candidates had little reason to pursue changes in state law that made it easier
to split votes for President and Vice President. The source of homogeneity
had changed from the party to the President, but the reality and the result remained the same.
V.

Conclusion

At the time of its creation, there was no office in the world like the
American President. The moment that the possibility of a single executive
official at the apex of the pyramid of the Executive Branch was mentioned,
there was a silence in the room of the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia.115 Years later, while the idea of a single, powerful, elected
chief executive has become more common, the homogeneity of the American
Executive Branch has not. The Executive Branch in Washington is dominated by those from the same party and from the same wing of that party.
If we want to know how this came to be, we can look back at history
and see the unintended consequences of a constitutional amendment as partly
responsible. During the early years of the republic, the founders altered and
modified executive power, and engaged in lengthy discussions about the nature of the Executive Branch. While they wanted a more powerful President,
they also wanted a President surrounded by a range of cabinet and other
officials—and this was still the case after the creation of the Twelfth
Amendment.
Over the two-hundred years plus since the Twelfth
Amendment, however, the reality has become something different, and the
hurdles that the Twelfth Amendment created for a divided Executive have
become nearly insurmountable.

113. See House, supra note 94, at 50–51 (“The enormous consequence of [the Twelfth
Amendment] has been to make party government constitutional. It has made it imperative that the
President and Vice-President be party representatives and practically impossible that they be chosen
at the outset from different parties, unless the election devolves upon the House or Senate.”).
114. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43, at 47.
115. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 55 (1966).

